Criminal Law -- Offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor When Vehicle Is Motionless by Corbett, Luke R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 36 | Number 3 Article 8
4-1-1958
Criminal Law -- Offense of Driving Under the
Influence of Intoxicating Liquor When Vehicle Is
Motionless
Luke R. Corbett
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luke R. Corbett, Criminal Law -- Offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor When Vehicle Is Motionless, 36 N.C. L. Rev.
322 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol36/iss3/8
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tive purpose,15 and questions asked must be pertinent to the matter un-
der inquiry.16 When the investigation is by committee, the pertinency
of questions is "determined by reference to the scope of the authority
vested in the committee"'17 by its authorizing resolution. Also, the con-
gressional need for the information sought must be weighed against
rights secured to the witness by the first amendment.' 8
It seems logical that there would be no congressional need for an
investigation if the principal goal of the committee were public exposure
of the individual's political beliefs or past associations. Since Congress
has no power to expose for exposure's sake, this should be true because
Congress ought not to be able legally to conduct an investigation by
committee which it could not legally conduct itself. Congress could
have no legitimate need for information which it could not legally
acquire. By this view, Watkins might have been decided on the
ground that the evidence of improper committee motivation should have
been admitted in order to give the defendant an opportunity to prove
that he was convicted pursuant to an invalid investigation.
GASTON H. GAGE
Criminal Law-Offense of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating
Liquor When Vehicle Is Motionless
In 1955, 1,165 persons met death by accident on North Carolina
highways.' This placed North Carolina eighth in the nation in total
highway accident deaths, and eleventh in deaths per vehicle-miles
traveled 2-- figures which are representative of North Carolina's accident
rate for recent years.3 Of these 1,165 accidental deaths, approximately
ten per cent may be attributed to the effects of alcohol.4 These simple
figures indicate the gravity of North Carolina's highway "alcohol-
accident" problem and the pressing need for some effective corrective
action. It will be the purpose of this Note to consider one area of the
" Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Barry v. United States ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1928); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1926) ; In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1896).
10 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1926).
'7 Sinclair v. United, States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) ; Barry v. United States
ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1928) (dictum).
"
8 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; Shenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918).
NEW YoRK HERALn TRIBUNE, THE Woaw ALMANaC 367 (1957).
Ibid.8 Id., 1945-55.
'The ingestion of enough alcohol to give a blood content of between 0.10 and
0.15 per cent alcohol (which is for most people five or six cocktails) multiplies
the chances of a person's having an accident by three. If the blood content of
alcohol goes above 0.15 per cent, a person's chances of having an accident are
multiplied by ten. Traffic Review & Digest, Aug. 1954, p. 2.
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law where some such corrective action might appropriately be taken.
A situation which involves great potential danger to the highway
public and which has given the courts of other states considerable
difficulty is this: The defendant is found alone in the front seat of an
automobile, obviously intoxicated. The car is stopped on a public
thoroughfare at night; the lights are on, but the engine is dead. There
is no evidence as to how the car got there, or how long it or the
defendant has been there. The controlling statute makes it unlawful
to operate or drive an automobile while under the influence of alcohol.5
The question is, should the defendant be convicted on these facts of
driving or operating a car while intoxicated? Do the foregoing facts
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated
his car while intoxicated?
There have been four cases decided where the facts were essentially
those given above,6 and the result is an even split as to what con-
clusions should be drawn from the facts.
Supporting the view that a set of facts such as outlined above is
sufficient to go to the jury, and therefore sufficient to support a con-
viction of drunken driving, is State v. Bauwngartner.7  There, the de-
fendant was found at about midnight in his truck, stopped in the proper
traffic lane on a main street. His lights and ignition were on, but the
engine was off. The defendant was slumped over the wheel, uncon-
scious. On appeal from a conviction of drunken driving, the defendant
contended there was no evidence that he had driven the truck while
drunk. The court rejected the argument, stating:
It is true that no one actually saw defendant driving his truck,
but the evidence amply supports the conclusion that he actually
did so. From the undisputed facts in the case the inference is
inescapable that defendant operated his truck while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor.8
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953) provides as follows: "It shall be unlawful
and punishable... for any person . . . who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or narcotic drugs, to drive any vehicle upon the highways within this
State."
0 State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 29 A.2d 582 (1942) ; State v. Hazen, 176
Kan. 594, 272 P.2d 1117 (1952); State v. Baumgartner, 21 N.J. Super. 348,
91 A.2d 222 (App. Div. 1952); State v. Hall, 271 Wis. 450, 73 N.W.2d 585(1955). For cases involving the question of what constitutes "driving" or "opera-
tion," see 5A Am. JuR., Automobiles & Highway Trafic §§ 1161, 1162 (1956); 61'
C.J.S., Motor Vehicles §§ 628, 633 (1949). For cases discussing "intoxication,"
see 5A Am. JuR., Automobiles & Highway Trafic § 1159 (1956); 61 C.J.S.,
Motor Vehicles §§ 625, 627 (1949). For cases on attempts to drive, see 5A Am.
JuR., Automobiles & Highway Traic § 1167 (1956); 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles
§ 630 (1949). For a comprehensive discussion of the various aspects of the
subject, see Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 570 (1956).
State v. Baumgartner, supra note 6.8 Id. at -, 91 A.2d at 223.
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In accord with the foregoing case is State v. Hazen,9 where the court
said,
For all the record shows, the jury reached the obvious con-
clusion that the defendant drove the vehicle to the place where
it was found, and that at the time was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, on the theory that a sober person would not
park his car in the middle of the highway with the lights off,
after dark . . . . [T]he circumstantial evidence above related
was sufficient to withstand the demurrer and to support the ver-
dict of guilty.10
In contrast to these cases is State v. Hall."' Again the facts were
those of the hypothetical, 12 but on appeal from a conviction this court
stated:
[T]here is no evidence that he had operated his automobile
while intoxicated. He was not seen driving the car; the car was
not seen in motion prior to the time the officers found it; no one
knew how long it had been there; the defendant was seated on
the passenger side. . . . The inferences that may be drawn from
the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as
with guilt.'8
In State v. McDonough,14 the court reversed a conviction with this
language:
Our law is settled that the proof of guilt must exclude, not
every possible, but every reasonable supposition of the innocence
of the accused .... We conclude that the evidence in the instant
case does not exclude every reasonable supposition of the inno-
cence of the defendant.
. .. A rational and reasonable conclusion would be that
another person had driven the car and had gone to secure as-
sistance in extricating the wheel from the wire.15
176 Kan. 594, 272 P.2d 1117 (1954). The defendant in this case was found on
a rural road instead of in the city, and his lights were off instead of on.
1O Id. at 595, 272 P.2d at 1118.
1271 Wis. 450, 73 N.W.2d 585 (1955).
" In this case, the car was stopped at night with the lights burning and the
engine running. The right front door was open, and it appeared that the defendant
had gotten out to answer a call of nature. When found, he was in the passenger's
seat.
18 State v. Hall, 271 Wis. 450, 452, 73 N.W.2d 585, 586 (1955).
"129 Conn. 483, 29 A.2d 582 (1942). This case differs from the preceding
cases in that the car was in a ditch on the right-hand side of the road with a
wheel over a wire of a fence.5 Id. at 485, 29 A.2d at 583. For cases involving slight variations on the
facts of the principal cases given above and which uphold a conviction, see: State
v. Elliott, 13 N.J. Super. 432, 80 A.2d 473 (App. Div. 1951) (Defendant was seen
drunk, and a short time thereafter his car was seen being driven into his back-
yard with only one occupant. Shortly after this the defendant was found slumped
over its steering wheel; held, logical conclusion that the defendant was driving
under the influence of alcohol.); Hughes v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 300, 276 S.W.2d
[Vol. 36
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Drunken driving in North Carolina is prohibited by G.S. § 20-138,16
which defines three distinct elements of the offense: (1) driving a
vehicle, (2) on the highway,17 (3) while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor.' 8 In the situation hereinbefore presented, the latter
two elements would not be in issue. As to the first, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that "driving" imports motion,19 and, there-
fore, sitting at the wheel of a standing car would not, as such, violate
the statute.
No North Carolina case has been found which has presented the
hypothetical fact situation under consideration, but in a case bearing
some analogy to the present situation,20 the state's evidence showed that
the defendant's truck ran into A's car, and that the defendant was "in
the truck going off."'2 1 A got a policeman and they found the defendant
alone in his truck a short time later about six-tenths of a mile from the
scene of the accident. On the defendant's motion for nonsuit, the court
held the evidence sufficient to support a conviction of operating a vehicle
while under the influence. This case differs from the principal cases
discussed herein in that there was some direct evidence that the de-
813 (1955) (Witness saw car being driven erratically; only one person in it. Car
stopped, witness went on for eleven miles and informed patrolman who found
defendant as reported. Conviction upheld.).
For similar cases refusing to uphold a conviction, see People v. Kelly, 27 Cal.
App. 753, 70 P.2d 276 (App. Dep't 1937) (Two cars collided; when witness
appeared defendant and a young woman were standing at the scene. Appellate
court reversed a conviction; driver could have been either party.) ; Kelley v.
State, 294 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. 1956) (Witness wakened by sound of crash
outside home; dressed and went to scene immediately. Found defendant in car
alone, with the left front door open. Conviction reversed on appeal; state did not
disprove hypothesis that car could have been driven by another.) ; Spinks v. State,
156 Tex. Crim. 418, 243 S.W.2d 173 (1951) (Witness heard crash and went to
investigate. Found defendant climbing out left side of front seat. Conviction
reversed for insufficient evidence.). For an extreme case upholding conviction, see
Lytle v. State, 299 P.2d 175 (Okla. 1956) (Witness saw a car ahead of him speed-
ing and apparently trying to hit another car. Witness took license number, and
saw car parked; there was only one occupant. He then notified policeman, who
found car as reported. Policeman then went into nearby pool hall where he found
defendant, owner of car, who had the keys to the car. Policeman had seen de-
fendant drive car "previously," but defendant was not identified by witness. A
conviction of drunken drivinq was upheld.).
a N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953).
17 For a discussion of this element of the offense, see State v. Perry. 230 N.C.
361, 53 S.E.2d 288 (1949).18 For a discussion of the tests of intoxication in North Carolina, see State
v. Willard, 241 N.C. 259, 84 S.E.2d 899 (1954). For a discussion of the sufficiency
and admissibility of the evidence of intoxication, see State v. Willard, supra;
State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d 763 (1952) ; State v. Newton. 207 N.C.
323, 177 S.E. 184 (1934). For a definition of "under the influence," see State v.
Lee, 237 N.C. 263, 74 S.E.2d 654 (1953) ; State v. Biggerstaff, 226 N.C. 603, 39
S.E.2d 619 (1946) ; State v. Carroll.-*226 N.C. 237, 37 S.E.2d 688 (1946).
1" State v. Hatcher, 210 N.C. 55, 185 S.E. 435 (1936).
'0 State v. Nail, 239 N.C. 60, 79 S.E.2d 354 (1953).
a- Id. at 61, 79 S.E2d at 355. The reported evidence did not make this point
entirely clear.
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fendant who was found in the truck had been "in the truck going off"
only a short time previously.22
The traditional rule governing the sufficiency of circumstantial evi-
dence to go to the jury in North Carolina is stated in the leading case of
State v. Matthews:23 "[T]he true rule is that the circumstances and
evidence must be such as to produce a moral certainty of guilt and
to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis."24 The differing functions
of the court and the jury were explained in State v. Prince :25 "The
sufficiency of proof in law is for the court-the moral weight of legally
sufficient proof is for the jury."26  Applying the North Carolina rule
as stated in the preceding cases to the hypothetical situation earlier
stated, there is at least some doubt that the North Carolina Supreme
Court would allow such a case to go to the jury under the existing
statute.
27
Ten states28 now have statutes making it unlawful to drive or to be
in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated,29 and both
Canada and England have long had such statutes.30 Only four cases
have been found involving the construction of state statutes prohibiting
control of a vehicle while intoxicated.31 In State v. Webb,3 2 after first
deciding that the Arizona statute33 defined a new crime, the court re-
marked,
It appears to us to be even more important for the legislature
to prevent operators of cars who are under the influence of in-
toxicating liquors... from entering upon the highways and into
the stream of traffic than to permit them to enter thereon and
after a tragic accident has happened to punish them for maiming
22 Cf. State v. Newton, 207 N.C. 323, 177 S.E. 184 (1934).
22 66 N.C. 106 (1872).
2
'Id. at 115.
2- 182 N.C. 788, 108 S.E. 330 (1921).
2" Id. at 791, 108 S.E. at 331. For a collection of cases on the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence to go to the jury, see State v. Smith, 236 N.C. 748, 73
S.E.2d 901 (1952).
27 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1953).
23 Ariz., Ark., Fla., Idaho, Mont., Neb., N.M., Tenn., Utah, and Wash.
20A typical statute is that of Arizona, which provides in pertinent parts: "It is
unlawful and punishable . . . for any person who is under the influence of intox-
icating liquor to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this
state." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (1956).
"0 CAN. Ray. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) ; Road Traffic Act, 1930, 20 & 21
GEo. 5, c. 43, § 15.
", State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954) ; Uldrich v. State, 162 Neb.
746, 77 N.W.2d 305 (1956) ; State v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio Op. 443 (C.P. 1945) ; State
v. Mason, 89 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1955). West Virginia and Ohio have since
amended their statutes eliminating the "control" provisions. OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN.
§ 4511.19 (Page 1954) ; W. VA. Coos ANN. § 1721(331) (1955).
State v. Webb, supra note 31.
" ARiz. RFV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (1956).
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or causing the death of those who are lawfully in the use of such
highways.
3 4
Two of the other decisions 35 are of similar import; the third, however,
holds that a statute similar to that of Arizona defined but one crime,36
viz., drunken driving.
The English and Canadian cases seem now to be wholly agreed that
statutes imposing criminal liability for being in the "actual physical
control" of a vehicle while intoxicated defined a new crime.37 Prior
to the statutory amendment in 1947,38 there was disagreement among
the Canadian cases on whether mens rea was an essential element of the
crime, 3 9 but the amendment seems to have effectively established that
being in control of a vehicle while intoxicated ipso facto constitutes the
crime.40  Furthermore, it places the burden on an intoxicated person
found in the driver's seat to prove that he was not in control.
41
The English courts have gone even further in their decisions on this
question. In a case decided in 1952,42 the defendant had come out of a
pub, and was walking toward a van parked nearby. He was observed
by an officer, who inquired if the defendant was going to drive the van
home. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, the officer arrested the
defendant for being in charge of a vehicle while intoxicated. The case
was dismissed below, but on appeal, the court said, in abrupt language
clearly indicative of its feelings on the matter, "I cannot understand the
difficulty which the justices of Middlesex . . . found in this case." 43
Whereupon it reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for trial.44
In view of the gravity of the "alcohol-accident" problem in North
Carolina, and the probability that the North Carolina court would not
" State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 11, 274 P.2d 338, 339 (1954), quoting from State
v. Harold, 74 Ariz. 210, 215, 246 P.2d 178, 181 (1952).
"' State v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio Op. 443 (C.P. 1945) ; State v. Mason, 89 S.E.2d
425 (W. Va. 1955).
" Uldrich v. State, 162 Neb. 746, 77 N.W.2d 305 (1956).
" Rex v. Crowe, [1941] 76 Can. Crim. R. 170, 4 D.L.R. 82; Jowett-Shooter
v. Franklin, [1949] 2 All E.R. 730 (K.B.).
"Criminal Code, 1947, 11 GEO. 6, c. 55, § 10 (Canada).
"See Rex v. Crowe, [1941] 76 Can. Crim. R_ 170, 4 D.L.R. 82; Rex v.
Thomson, [1941] 75 Can. Crim. R. 141, 1 D.L.R. 516.
" Rex v. Johnston, [1950] 97 Can. Crim. R. 345, 3 D.L.R. 48.
1 The present Canadian statute reads, in part, as follows: "[W]here a person
occupies the seat ordinarily occupied by the driver of a motor vehicle or automobile
he shall be deemed to have the care or control of the vehicle unless he establishes
that he did not enter or mount the vehicle for the purpose of setting it in motion."
CAN. REv. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) (later amended, Criminal Code, 1954, 2-3
ELIZ. 2, c. 51, §§ 222-24 (Canada)).
"Leach v. Evans, [1952] 2 All E.R. 264 (Q.B.).
,3 Ibid.
"Ibid. An interesting development of the English law was the extension of the
provisions of their comparable law to include the operation of bicycles. Road
Traffic Act, 1930, 20 & 21 GEo. 5, c. 43, § 15 (later amended, 4 & 5 ELIZ. 2, c.
67, § 11 (1956)).
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sustain a conviction in the hypothetical hereinbefore presented, it is
suggested that a statute such as that in force in Canada45 is desirable.
Under the Canadian statute, the elements of the offense are two:
(1) impairment of the defendant's ability to drive a motor vehicle by
alcohol; and (2) having the care or control of a motor vehicle during
such impairment. Such a statute properly relieves the courts of the
burden of trying to reconcile the need for full proof of guilt of the
accused with the conflicting need for protection of the public on the
highways. It properly raises a presumption against one who is found in
such circumstances, yet it does not foreclose a showing by the defendant
that he was not actually in control 6 of the vehicle, and was not, there-
fore, creating the danger which is to be obviated.
LUxE R. CORBETT
Criminal Procedure-Arrest Without a Warrant-Informer's Tip as
Constituting Reasonable Grounds
In Draper v. United States' a federal narcotics agent was notified by
a hired informer that defendant was peddling dope to several addicts
in the Denver area. Four days later the informer revealed that de-
fendant would go to Chicago to get heroin on a certain day and that
he would return on a morning train on either of two given days. The
informer's tips had always been reliable in the past. The agent had
never heard of defendant before and it was not shown whether or not
he had a criminal record. A complete description of physical char-
acteristics, clothing, and manner of walking was given. On the morn-
ing of the second day the agent saw a man leaving the Chicago train
who matched the description given by the informer. Defendant was
approached and seized by the agent. When he gave a name which did
not correspond with the tip his wallet was taken and his true identity
learned. He was placed under arrest and a search of his person re-
vealed two ounces of heroin and a syringe. The agent had no warrant.
Before tria2 defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment3
because made incident to an unlawful arrest. Thus the sole issue on the
"CAN. REv. STAT. c. 36, § 285(4) (1927) (later amended, Criminal Code,
1954, 2-3 ELiz. 2, c. 51, §§ 222-24 (Canada)).
"Rex v. Johnston, [1950] 97 Can. Crim. R. 345, 3 D.L.R. 48 (dictum). Cf.
Jowett-Shooter v. Franklin, [1949] 2 All E.R. 730 (K.B.) (Defendant who got
into a car, but not under the steering wheel, and not intending to drive, found to
be in charge of vehicle, but driving permit not suspended because no intent to
drive).
'248 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1957).
2United States v. Draper, 146 F. Supp. 689 (D. Colo. 1956).
'U.S. CoTsT. amend. IV.
[Vol. 36
